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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

THE LOGICAL IMPLICATES OF THE COMMUNITY

IF the ideal human society is an all-inclusive community of individuals, engaged in mutual cooperation and interpenetrating one another with mutual affection, a community constituted by and expressing itself through mutual helpfulness, support and love—if this be the true conception of the real community, then it must first of all rest upon a common understanding. For cooperation without understanding is not the voluntary cooperation of free and rational beings—the society of the ant-hill is not a human society; and love without mutual understanding is an insecure and unstable passion, disturbed by a restless and consuming anxiety.

There are many kinds and degrees of understanding. An understanding may be established and maintained at different levels, and may be characterized by different degrees of abstractness or concreteness. Thus if one says he likes cubist art and appreciates Wagnerian music, it is one thing to understand his words and their obvious logical meaning, and quite another thing to appreciate his feeling. If some one tells me he intends to commit a murder, it is possible to understand what it is that he inteds to do without in the least understanding the man himself in his intention. The more abstract kinds of understanding, constituted as they are by the ability to grasp the objective meaning of words and their grammatical construction, are necessary prerequisites, generally speaking, to the realization of the more concrete kinds of understanding —necessary conditions, but certainly not sufficient conditions. If we call the more abstract understanding logical, we may speak of the more concrete understandings under the main heads of esthetic and ethical understanding.

Esthetic understanding is appreciation, the sensitiveness or empathy which incorporates in one's own esthetic life the feeling of another, perhaps with full sympathy, perhaps with a certain degree of reservation and criticism. In complete moral understanding an act is grasped in its motive or intention, is conceived as a possibility for oneself, and justified as morally valid. Moral understanding is an acknowledgment of the strivings and purposes of our fellow-men, and a true appreciation of their meaning and value; it

is the most concrete kind of understanding that life affords, and is, as such, both a necessary prerequisite for the perfect community, and the crowning consummation of the struggle for its realization.

In comparison with the fullness and richness of these moral and esthetic conditions, the merely logical implicates of the community must inevitably seem thin and abstract, pale and bloodless. And yet, they are in a certain sense the first to be considered, since they are logically prior, even though their value be not supreme. For unless men are capable, in principle, of a logical understanding of one another, they can not understand one another either esthetically or ethically, since moral and esthetic judgments also incorporate within them the forms of logical judgments.

The logical tests of thought and its products are: rationality in the sense of meaningfulness, consistency, and truth. Each following value in this advancing scale includes the previous value, but not *vice versa*. The primary test of rationality, as well as the primary test of consistency, is the principle of identity. This ancient law is usually formulated in so blind a fashion as itself to invite misunderstanding, though it is in very truth the parent of all understanding. In itself it appears to constitute a mere tautology; it is its human background and context which gives it sense and import. But when it is formulated without this reference to its relevant context, it takes on so trivial and futile an appearance that its only chance of attaining any importance at all is to be so fortunate as to become the object of attack. Hence it has been its portion to meet with doubt and distortion and attempted refutation, from the beginning of philosophic time to the dawn of the present pragmatic day. And yet I believe that the principle of identity can be so stated as to carry with it both a spontaneous conviction of its truth and a lively sense of its fundamental importance.

What, then, is the principle of identity? It is a logical principle which at one and the same time defines the individual mind's continuity of thinking, and the social consciousness of a common thought and a common world. It asserts that meanings of all kinds, and hence also the corresponding objects, may be apprehended as identically the same, whether by the same mind at different times, or by different minds at the same or different times. A is A, whether I think it yesterday, to-day or to-morrow; the A of yesterday can be grasped by to-day's or to-morrow's thought. The pale consolation claimed by the poet in the lines:

Gestern liebt ich,
Heute leid ich,
Morgen sterb ich;
Dennoch denk ich
Heut' und morgen
Gern an gestern—

even this sorry consolation can be the poet's possession only on sufferance of the abstract logical law of identity! The law of identity asserts in addition that the universe of discourse is the same for all minds that really understand each other, and in so far as they do so understand one another. The conduct of all meaningful thought, therefore, whether individual or social, requires the validity of this law as its first condition. If there were only one mind, and this mind had only one pulse of thought, the law would still be true; but it would then have lost its meaning and applicability in practise. But when this single mind begins to conduct its reflection in time, the possibility of identifying the same becomes an essential condition of the rationality of its reflection. If there are two minds, the social aspect of the principle comes into play. It is a truism to say that there can be no meeting of minds except on common ground; the existence in the ideal world of identical and common meanings is the indispensable background which makes the realization of such a common ground, and of a common world, possible.

To appreciate fully the truth and importance of this logical principle, it is well to make serious trial of the opposite hypothesis. If a meaning, once entertained, is gone forever, never to return, then the continuity of thought is broken absolutely; memory becomes a hollow mockery, like the counterfeit memory-ideas of Hume, distinguishable only from impressions and imagination-ideas by the degree of their intensity; and there is no such thing as mind, though perhaps there may be psychic processes in plenty. The momentary experience would be completely isolated, and in the next moment would be as if it had never been. Neither change nor sameness could be known. No meanings would remain to measure the change, and none to identify the sameness. Socially, the denial of the principle of identity would reflect itself in the frustration of all communication, and the stamping of all attempts to realize social intercourse as irrational and absurd. These alternatives are of course intolerable, their acceptance impossible, and their assertion intellectually suicidal. It is precisely this situation which justifies the recognition of a law of thought as an *a priori* necessity. The law of identity in its individual aspect asserts the possibility of an escape from the "present-moment predicament;" in its social aspect it asserts the possibility of an escape from the "ego-centric predicament," which latter predicament is only a variant of the former.

It scarcely seems necessary to add that the principle of identity has nothing to do with the sameness of things or persons perduring in time. The degree and nature of such sameness is, under the

logical conditions described, a question of ascertainable fact, and the principle of identity is wholly neutral as between a changing and an unchanging world. For even if there were no sameness at all in the objects of knowledge during two successive moments, the knowledge of this fact could only be ours under the condition that our meanings retained their identity with themselves, thus marking for us the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of each of the postulated unceasing changes. The sameness of all objects existing in time is partial and relative; the sameness of ideal meanings is absolute. Our grasp of this ideal sameness is of course not absolute, and our many partial or complete failures involve us in varying degrees of confusion of thought. But whoever seeks a clear understanding must believe that it is logically (and psychologically) possible, and that it is a rewarder of all who seek it diligently. The rationality of the search for an understanding with ourselves and our neighbors, and the absolute logical validity of the principle of identity, are but the obverse and the converse sides of one and the same thing.

The principle of identity is not the only logical implicate of the community. It suffices to define the nature of the universal; but it does not suffice to define in a more concrete way the nature of the knowledge which makes conscious cooperation possible, nor does it imply concretely the nature of the known world in which conscious cooperation can take place. And naturally, it does not by any means suffice to define truth. The so-called law of sufficient reason, however, is a sheaf of principles, each of which takes us a step or two farther on this road. The vagueness with which this law is ordinarily formulated and explained is a reproach to logic. It is not a single law, but conceals under an ambiguous phraseology at least three distinct principles, each independent of the rest, though exhibiting with one another a faint analogy, tending perhaps to explain if not to justify the historical cohesion between them. It covers, *first*, the principle of inference: that judgments may be concatenated into systems of logical interdependence, so that one or several judgments may serve as the reason for a conclusion. It covers, *second*, the principle of causation, which asserts that things behave in some uniform manner; and it covers, *third*, the principle of teleology, which asserts that there is a reason for all existing things, so that the universe has a rational meaning. All these principles underlie various aspects of the community life. The first makes experience possible, and the wisdom that comes from experience. Without it we should be the prey of blind circumstance, and our neighbors would find our actions unaccountable, lacking in the

evidence of rational planning. Cooperation could not be conscious, its success could be only accidental, and its outcome generally subject to the arbitrary tyranny of the blindly irrational. The second, namely the principle of causation, makes planning possible from the objective side, and cooperation between planners; hence it asserts the possibility of a concrete and essential aspect of all community life. The teleological principle posits the existence of a valid and adequate motive for the life of the individual and of the community. Its negation is the assertion of the doctrine of the Preacher, that all is vanity and vexation of spirit. The ideal community sets itself up as a rational aim for human effort, a goal in which no life need be lost and no striving useless, but where a glorious meaning crowns every sincere and earnest endeavor.

Is the logical order here described as implicated in the notion of the community, a datum or a construct, a gift or an achievement? At the risk of seeming to straddle both sides of the contemporary philosophical fence, I must assert my conviction that it is both; although of course not in identically the same sense. In itself, that is, in its ideal existence, the logical order is something preexisting; in its use and application for knowledge and life it is a human discovery and a human achievement. There is a world of ideas, timeless and unchanging. It exists for us to apprehend as far as we can, and to make increasingly effective as an instrumentality of knowledge. There is a logical order which is prior to the actual order, and it is for us to mold the actual order by growing into an increasingly fuller mastery of the gifts and opportunities afforded by the ideal order. Its prior existence constitutes the possibility of the actual fruitful work of human thought in science and in life.

To assert the existence of the logical order is one thing, and to confound this existence with an individually attained clearness of conception, or the concrete possession of actual knowledge, is an entirely different thing. The latter confusion is the distinguishing mark of what may be called intellectualism in the derogatory sense. The essence of this error is the identification of potentiality with actuality; by which identification both categories lose their real meaning. The "might have been" of the past, and the "may be" of the future, are under this identification robbed of all resemblance to themselves, crushed by the bleak tyranny of a necessity, which, when it plays this rôle, is no longer a merely logical necessity, but becomes a sort of fate. The existence of the entire logical order constitutes only the ideal framework around which the actual achievements of thought and science and daily life are slowly and painfully consolidated. The logical order is indeed a limit set

upon human thought. But it also affords to human thought its proper task and opportunity. It binds in order to set us free. It is a perfect law yielding to perfect obedience the reward of freedom.

The fantastic assumption that this logical order is in some mysterious way a dramatic achievement of bold and daring pioneering minds, and so created *ad hoc* by them to serve our purposes and desires, is an absurd and self-contradictory assumption. For every achievement, no matter how original and daring, must at least be the achievement of something. And if the achievement is a conscious achievement, this something is present to thought in advance of its consummation. But since nothing can be identified as being what it is instead of being something else, without implying the prior validity of the logical order, the assumption that the logical order is created in this way is self-contradictory. The normal logical man discovers the logical order, just as he discovers truth; it is only the abnormal logical superman of heated fancy who creates the logical order, or wills it into being as over against a hostile world, just as he is also supposed to make the truth to *happen* or *become* in verifying it. The logical superman is no less fantastic and unreal than the moral superman. Instead of acknowledging and obeying the moral ideals that are to be found for the searching, the latter creates ideals and "transvalues values." Not content to transcend the modest idealism of Goethe,

> *Die Wahre war schon längst gefunden . . . . . .*
> *Die alte Wahre, fass es an!*

—not content with making a first discovery of new moral truth, he creates such truth for himself and for others. They have both—the logical and the moral superman—eaten of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and have imagined themselves as gods. A skeptic once asked whether, if you put in a lie at one end of the Atlantic cable, it would come out a truth at the other. This magic trick is the superman's grand accomplishment in the world of the spirit—in the spiritual order, where if anything it is still more impossible of accomplishment than in the mechanical order of things!

The extremes of pragmatism and intellectualism are not so very far apart. Both Kant and Aristotle suggest that the reason creates the forms. A pragmatist like Schiller assigns this function to the will; but if the latter creates the forms of rational knowledge out of its own resources, then this will and that reason are one in function and in fact. What saves intellectualists of the type of Kant and Aristotle from occupying the extreme position, is the

acknowledgment of a limiting and indeterminate ὕλη, or of an objective but unknowable *ding an sich*. The true position appears to me to be that there is nothing in the forms which is not also in the things, and that both forms and things are discoveries. The real meaning of such categories as an indeterminate matter, or an underlying substance, or an unknown thing in itself, or, as in James and other moderns, a chaotic and indeterminate flux, is to point or embody the distinction between logical content and actual existence. This distinction is not a matter of logical content; actual existence does not differ from possible or conceived existence in logical content, but only in the kind of existence, actual existence being believed in and asserted, while possible existence is only conceived of as possible. But if the forms constitute a human or superhuman contribution to the things, altering them and transforming them in order to make them knowable, then the resulting knowledge is not really knowledge of these things, but the knowledge of others, which have first been made before they are known; the resulting apprehension, considered as an apprehension of the first order of things, is a misapprehension. If we create truth, we create it either under given conditions which limit and modify our creative activities; or we create it absolutely. But creation of truth under objective limiting conditions, is not creation, but discovery of truth. And an absolute creation of truth is not distinguishable from an absolute creation of illusion or falsehood, as Nietszche so deeply felt and so eloquently expressed. The arbitrariness of the process renders nugatory the distinction between the truth and the falsity of the product. For both truth and falsity are relational categories.

The preexistence of a valid logical order is the first necessary condition for the realization of the true community. But (shall I now say fortunately or unfortunately?) it is not the sole or sufficient condition. There is a host of real and ideal conditions, physical, economic, political, esthetic and moral, all equally indispensable with the logical. If it be true that to understand is to forgive, then this principle is true only under the assumption of so concrete a meaning for the term understanding, that it far transcends any merely logical interpretation of that category. And the validity of the logical order is so abstract a condition that it does not carry with it the actuality of even a logical understanding on the part of any individual; so that the realization of a moral and esthetic harmony is scarcely even foreshadowed in the abstract logical order itself. It is its identification with this latter goal that mars that otherwise genial product of Josiah Royce's thought, the doctrine developed in the *Problem of Christianity*. The identification which constitutes

the leading principle of that book, leads inevitably to a static instead of a dynamic view of life, no matter how earnestly we try to transcend the immobility of the logical essences by introducing into them the idea of a self-repeating reflection, which can neither create anything new nor change anything old. It leads to a non-moral view of life; which is natural enough, since it begins by annihilating life. It can find no real room for either the possibility or the actuality of error, or of evil. And it reveals its fundamental absurdity in the final astounding equation of the logical order with the invisible church universal, a community instinct with the life of the Holy Spirit; than which no confusion could be more profound.

The logical order is valid and necessary; the actual order, for which the logical order furnishes in part the framework, is at one and the same time a beneficent gift and a moral task for the highest energies of free men.

DAVID F. SWENSON.

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INTELLIGENCE AND MENTAL TESTS[1]

GRATIFYING at least it is to observe that psychologists are beginning to weigh the results of work in mental tests, and to deplore in these results the almost complete absence of returns possessing permanent psychological value. And hopeful indeed is the discovery that the cause of the failure of mental testing to contribute to the development of psychology is the failure to arrive at an understanding of the nature of the materials with which the mental tester works.[2] At this point one is moved to comment upon the unhappy divorce between the labors of those working with mental tests, and the interpretations of the theoretical psychologist.

The writer fears that we do not carefully enough distinguish between the traditional speculative psychologist, who based his work upon assumptions, very remotely, if at all, related to concrete facts, and the theoretical psychologist who does critically evaluate concrete psychological facts, and suggests the direction of further observation of them.[3] Essentially, the theoretical psychologist performs the function of a consulting scientist. To deny that the theoretical scientist is a scientist because he does not himself conduct an experi-

[1] The thesis here presented constitutes the substance of a paper read before the Psychological Seminar in the University of Minnesota, 1916–17.

[2] *Cf.* Ruml, this JOURNAL, XVII., p. 57.

[3] For a statement concerning the relative position of the theoretical and practical scientist *cf.* Rignano, *Scientific Synthesis* (1918), Ch. 1.

ment, provided he is possessed of laboratory training, is exactly like denying that the consulting engineer is an engineer because he does not himself hold the contract to build a bridge.

The unfortunate consequence of the early assumption of the applied psychologist, namely, that it was unnecessary to define intelligence clearly, was the uncritical acceptance of the view that intelligence was a permanent entity or a complete faculty. Individuals were looked upon as analogous to chemical elements, and just as the latter were each presumed to possess a given chemical affinity for some other elements, so intelligence was conceived as a metapsychological property of the person.[4] In general, intelligence was looked upon as a mental force in some manner related to a body, and which adjusted the body to certain objects in contact with the body. Misguiding in the extreme appears the analogy referred to, since the valence of a chemical element is not an occult power, but a fact observed in the combination of elements, that is, the multiple of unit charges of positive or negative electricity which an element holds. Unfortunately, however, the infelicitous anthropomorphic attitude with which psychologists approached both the data of physics and psychology was responsible for the adoption of a completely unsatisfactory view concerning the character of intelligence. Now when we study intelligence as an observed fact we never find any absolute essence or faculty performing unique kinds of activities. Traces of such a view in current psychology are probably vestiges of the theological influence upon science, from the complete rejection of which psychology would greatly benefit.

Intelligence is really a name or a scientific category which denotes certain specific forms of definite reactions. Thus, an intelligent act or intelligent behavior is comparatively a more effective adjustment response than are other sorts. Justifiable then appears the view of some psychologists who consider volitional, voluntary, and even habit acts to be intelligent, while reflexes and original instincts are not.[5] In such a view, the fact of performing an act conditioned and perhaps improved by past experience constitutes an important factor in intelligence.

Possessing intelligence is, then, the fact of having acquired suitable reaction systems for the purpose of carrying out definite responses. Expertness is precisely the possession of intelligence in this sense, and expertness is a product of the interaction of an indi-

[4] No doubt the social psychologist would interpret the doctrine of permanent intelligence as a philosophical reflection of divine and natural rights, of accidentally invested special interests, which developed as a theoretical justification of some pecuniary, political or social *status quo*.

[5] This is not to say that reflexes and instincts are unconscious.

vidual with some particular kind of thing or condition. It is for this reason that we are willing and unashamed to be unintelligent or even stupid concerning facts and conditions in which we do not specialize or in which we are not interested. Says James:[6] "I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortified if others know much more psychology than I. But I am content to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek."

But here the problem arises why it is that, of two individuals who stake their all upon being lawyers and who receive the same training, one becomes a better lawyer than the other. Is it because the one possesses the better innate capacity? Observations of this type require always extremely careful analysis. In the first place, when we say a better lawyer we must be careful to keep our psychological problem clear of the entangling thicket of social conditions and social judgments. We must remember that, while it may be a mark of intelligence to enlist the aids necessary to become a good lawyer and to seize upon every expedient working for social success, such facts are beside the specific problem of attaining proficiency in the understanding and the administration of legal tradition and legal enactments.

That we can not, in such a case, completely avoid this thicket of social conditions makes us pause. Nothing is more pertinent than the question as to whether it is not precisely the surrounding conditions which really make, not only for betterness in the social scale, but also for greater intelligence of any specific sort, since the surroundings offer the occasion to develop more and more relevant responses for legal situations. Moreover, is it possible to speak of intelligence at all excepting in terms of definite forms of response which have been naturally acquired in concrete interaction with definite forms of stimulating objects? As a matter of fact, when studying concrete behavior the notion of an absolute general ability becomes dissipated.

And, further, what can be meant by the *same* legal training? Is training merely a casual contact of a person with things producing an indifferent effect upon him? Rather, is it not true that any present training is a definite characteristic function of a given person because such training depends upon previous acquisition of reaction systems? For this reason it is almost impossible for two individuals to undergo the same training. This fact is clearly apparent when we consider the numerous differences in what is commonly miscalled the same environment of two people, for instance of two members of the same family. It follows then that if two persons are to have

[6] *Principles of Psychology*, I., 310.

the same training they must have previously acquired the same type and quantity of reaction patterns which are relevant to the present situation. In point of fact when we have separated the normal from the abnormal or feeble-minded person, that is to say, the person of poor biological stock, we can readily convince ourselves that intelligence is entirely the product of a long series of cumulative trainings.

Nor is it possible to minimize the subtlety and the effectiveness of our acquisition of reaction patterns. Perhaps this is indicated most clearly by the fact that much of such acquisition passes for inherited talent. Confusion of acquired response systems with hypothetical inherited talent is exemplified in the following case. A child from early infancy is exposed to a musical environment, in which music and its cultivation are glorified, and as a consequence develops interests, technique, sentiments, and other forms of reaction patterns making for musicianship, but, in spite of this development, is looked upon as an inheritor of musical talent.

And so if talents are essentially acquisitions we must rephrase some popular expressions so that they will more exactly conform with the facts. Actors and other men of talent are made more readily when they are born into a theatrical or other characteristic environment, than when they are brought into such an environment after having developed in some alien *milieu* which made them into anything but actors. Much light is thrown upon the intricate problems of intelligence by the consideration that certain of the factors which contribute to the making of a good actor are common to other occupations. Clear it is then that the individual previously a machinist can not receive the same training from an identical law course as the individual who spent the corresponding time in the study of political and social history.[7] And so while the machinist is inferior in legal intelligence we have no indication that he is deficient in native ability.

Turning for a moment to the criterion of intelligence which is probably most prevalent, namely, that intelligence enables us to adjust ourselves to new situations, let us examine what is here meant by *new*. Is it not an obvious fact that we are entirely helpless in the face of a totally new situation? Psychologists unanimously agree upon this in the dictum that we can not even conceive anything absolutely new. What our intelligence criterion really means, then, is that, having developed many forms of reaction systems by contact with surrounding objects and conditions, we can now adapt ourselves to similar situations without additional learning. The implication here is of course that the intelligent individual is one who has acquired many of these necessary reaction patterns.

[7] We assume of course that the student of history has profited by his study.

Paradoxical as it may seem, intelligence is so decidedly not an entity or a faculty, that we may look upon it as being precisely as much a function (in the mathematical sense) of the environment[8] as of the person. What is meant is this, that so little in our intelligent behavior can be traced to an original unacquired factor that we must accredit the environing circumstances with their full share in the development of intelligence. And so while it is fundamentally false, on the surface it yet seems true that women have less intelligence than men. For you can not find women who are capable of doing many kinds of work which men can do. The rapidly decreasing number of such examples offers good evidence that what the lack of intelligence means in such cases is the absence of opportunity to develop intelligence, that is to say reaction patterns to perform certain adaptations to particular kinds of stimulating objects and situations. Immigrant women are notoriously less intelligent and less able to adjust themselves to their surroundings than their husbands, provided always that the former do not become wage earners and thus embrace the opportunity to develop more intelligence. To the credit of mental tests be it said that to a considerable extent it was through them that the superstition of male superiority was exploded. And let us not forget that it was through the definite study of actual environmental opportunity for development that the metaphysical belief in the preeminence of the civilized mind was dethroned.

Also we must note that the inferiority of intelligence in women and in so-called primitive people was not a fact observed, but a religio-politico-economic pronouncement concerning the relative values of souls. The writer ventures the opinion that with the passing of a subjectivistic psychology and its replacement by an extensive study of concrete human reactions the need for a native intelligence, whether omnicompetent, multicompetent or merely unicompetent, will disappear.[9] Such an intelligence, whether described as a general faculty or a multiplicity of specific abilities, belongs with those mysterious elements, the instincts, to the class of psychological impedimenta which not only do not add to our understanding of psychological phenomena, but actually prevent a factual study of them.

And now we must consider what light the work on psychological tests throws upon the problem of intelligence. A study of the actual procedure and results of mental tests proves conclusively that such tests are and can only be designed to measure some performance whose achievement is the result of a previous interaction of a person

[8] In the sense of conditions offering opportunity for developing reaction systems.

[9] One of the unique products of a soul theory of intelligence is the conception of innate mental weakness with some specific superior ability.

and objects (machines—materials). It is for this reason that "no test has any significance for employment purposes until it has been tried out on employees doing exactly the same kind of work as that for which new applicants are to be tested later on.[10] Illuminating in the extreme in this connection is the study of the limitations of mental tests. What must one conclude from the fact that mental tests are of no service in selecting executives? Should we say that mental tests do not attempt to measure intelligence? For surely, if they did, they could not be applied to any more directly functioning intelligence than is found in the work of an executive. But to accept this conclusion would mean giving up the whole problem of measuring intelligence, and this is impossible, for the genuine usefulness of the tests indicates that there may be degrees of intelligence, the lower ones of which may be very readily determined. Or should we say that intelligence is an unknowable thing, at least so far as tests are concerned, since tests are only useful for acts which have a definitely standardized form? To the writer it seems that the difficulty is entirely factitious and based upon the misconception that intelligence is native.

What the inapplicability of tests to the selection of executives really teaches us is, that all tests are performance tests based upon definite reaction patterns and not measures of connate capacity. Now since executive intelligence means the possession of innumerable and complex reaction systems it is entirely to be expected that the present development of tests should be still inadequate to meet the situation. And, further, the student of tests must be always unable to meet this situation if he persists in the belief that intelligence is innate, since such a view precludes the investigation of the actual contributing conditions which make possible complex human adjustments. To mention just one difficulty, the applied psychologist makes too wide a difference between moral and mental qualities, as though it were possible completely to separate these when an employment problem is under investigation. In this connection it is remarkable to observe upon what slender threads are sometimes hung the belief in an absolute intelligence factor. Thus the positive correlation between tapping, letter crossing, and other tests is presumed to be evidence of the presence of such a general intelligence factor.

To differentiate between mental tests and trade tests because the former measures native ability while the latter measures acquisition is to make an assumption not warranted by the facts of mental tests.[11]

[10] Link, *Employment Psychology*, p. 19.

[11] The writer finds encouraging the inclination of psychologists toward a concrete behavior view as manifest in the tendency to give up the term "mental tests" in favor of "psychological tests" to cover all work in this field of psychological application.

The fact is that the only difference between the two types of tests lies in the simplicity and definiteness of the latter. It is because the behavior investigated by the mental as over against the trade tests shows a greater complexity and variety, and is in general more difficult to study, that we may draw a definite line between the tests. One might say, then, that the difference between the intelligence of an executive and that of a machinist for a student of behavior lies in the comparative ease with which one can get an objective measure of the productivity of the latter. The writer is firmly convinced that with a larger conception of mental tests their value for the selection of executives may be vastly enhanced.

It may still be urged that the prominent individual differences to be found in persons must be sought in some unacquired quality in the person. We have already indicated that the probable source of such a view is to be found in some metapsychological prejudice rather than in observable facts. But the study of individual differences, it must be admitted, is fraught with grave perplexities, since in actual practise it is extremely difficult to ascertain clearly the precise points at which certain reaction systems constituting personal traits are actually acquired. Just how an individual has acquired a mathematical or a general scientific or a religious cast of mind is not an easy matter to determine. For the sake of science, however, we must plead for perseverance contempered with caution.

Nothing is less doubtful than that there are wide differences in intelligence, and nothing is more certain than that not every one is capable of mastering a given problem; but is this saying more than that intelligence once developed gives one an advantage in that it now can be employed? Certain it is also that the advantage one has over others in the possession of intelligence is due only to a series of concrete empirical events, once it is admitted that the persons under discussion are all of normal stock.

When once we determine to abjure the quick and easy way of accounting for the complex facts of psychological phenomena by referring them to occult causes or analogical symbols[12] and insist upon the study of concrete reactions, our way lies open to investigations which promise satisfactory solutions to our genuine psychological problems. In the consideration that the psychological reaction pattern is a mode of response of a living organism to complex surrounding conditions, we find the suggestion that the prepsychological[13] problem of individual differences lies precisely in the character of

[12] Such as Stern's illegitimate comparison of intelligence and electricity.

[13] By "prepsychological" is meant any phase of biological functioning at the basis of the specific reaction pattern.

the biological stock of the individual. Thus, for example, the neuroglandular organization of the person is of enormous influence in the determination of his psychological conduct. But although there is an inexhaustible source of such material, it is, as yet, practically untouched by scientific investigation. The same importance for the study of individual differences of action is attached to the perfection and degree of development of the receptor systems, as for example the rôle played by a specific condition of the auditory apparatus in the total complex of musical ability, or the qualities of the visual apparatus in mechanical or esthetic drawing. Not only does such information concerning the biological stock of the individual throw light upon the differentiation of persons into normal and abnormal, but it also illuminates the only possible source of inherited individual traits and differences. Undoubtedly, the complex and complete organization of the actual human individual when once known to a satisfactory degree will clear up many important problems of temperament, character, capacity, traits, and genius. The gain involved in awaiting such factual development is no less, let us repeat, than the acquisition of definite scientific information as over against unfounded and useless speculation.

In sum, the failure of the work of mental tests to yield principles leading to a wider extension of knowledge concerning psychological phenomena is due to the acceptance of the assumption that intelligence, or what is measured by the tests, is a mental factor and not a specific mode of adjustmental response. Thus scant attention is paid to the precise facts upon which the tests have their actual bearing. In consequence the work of mental testing merely leads to more work, but to no organized accomplishment of definite merit. To place emphasis upon the actual response as it can be studied will mean not only the avoidance of necessarily unfruitful attempts to seize upon a hypothetical faculty, but a positive understanding of actual psychological phenomena. The new direction which psychology would thus take would make superfluous such speculations as to whether the organization of the "mind" is such that its acts are related or unrelated. Instead, we would learn what the facts seem clearly to indicate, namely, that intelligent acts, as all psychological acts, must be *specific;* for our reaction patterns are definite, concrete responses. But, since our environment is more or less uniform and homogeneous, the acquisition of many response patterns must mean that our *general* capacity to respond to things is increased. Changes and improvements in the mode of responding to our surroundings are induced by variations in the objects and their relations, to which we find it necessary to adapt ourselves. In the

acquisition of numerous response patterns the person *ipso facto* takes on the qualities of general intelligence, among which are variety, independence, agility, and rapidity of response.

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DR. WILDON CARR'S THEORY OF THE RELATION BETWEEN BODY AND MIND

DR. CARR'S consideration of the relation between mind and the body in his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society[1] places the problem in an original setting, and renders still less tenable any parallelistic explanation; I should like to offer, however, a few notes on certain difficulties which still seem to remain in spite of his thoughtful treatment.

Dr. Carr regards the interaction as occurring between two systems which are existentially completely disparate—"there is no common factor in psychical and physiological process" (p. 7). At the same time I do not think that his view of mind as independently organized, and as responding therefore always as a whole, is as new as he takes it to be,[2] although I feel convinced that to regard the interaction as taking place essentially between wholes is the truest method of approaching the subject.

1. But the specific arguments advanced by Dr. Carr in support of this general position seem in several respects to lack cogency. "Consciousness" he affirms, "is the manifestation of an immaterial object—the soul" (p. 9); his reason being that "to be conscious or aware of an object is not to contemplate but to recognize it. Recognition implies precognition, presupposes memory and constructive imagination" (p. 10). But if recognition thus implies precognition, plainly this again requires a cognition still prior, and so *ad infinitum;* nor does this view again agree with the basal assumption as to knowledge which is made by Croce, and which has received, as is well known, Dr. Carr's own endorsement.[3]

Then in rejecting the suggestion that psychical activity is as such merely a function of the brain, Dr. Carr appears to me to be unconsciously rather dogmatic; his arguments certainly go a cer-

[1] *Proc:* 1917–18. p. 1.

[2] *Cf., e. g.,* Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality,* pp. 114, 168, 182, and the further references there. But does not Dr. Carr misinterpret Dr. Haldane's view of the body as a "perfect machine" (p. 6)? We have only to turn to p. 422 of the same volume to find him asserting that "a living organism differs from any mechanism which we can construct or conceive."

[3] *Cf. The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce,* ch. III.

tain length towards supporting his contention, but they are by no means sufficient for its complete establishment. I am not questioning the fact in itself—I agree, *i. e.*, that it is not the brain, but mind, which thinks; but Dr. Carr's proof of this principle does not seem to be final. He argues that all psychical acts must belong to mind only, because it always acts as a whole. But it is equally a fundamental principle with him that the brain (the body in fact) also acts as a whole, and that there is neither point-to-point correspondence nor union between them (p. 22), which excludes the possibility, therefore, that any single brain process always results in some special and restricted psychical activity; and thus it becomes *logically* possible for the brain, since it acts (like mind) as one whole, to produce psychical combinations of any degree of complexity. My contention is not that it ever actually does this, but that Dr. Carr's argument is in itself as it stands insufficient to prove its impossibility.

We reach the same conclusion if we consider this point from another aspect. Even when we admit interaction between brain and mind acting as wholes, we must still retain a view of their relation which (on account of their disparate nature) verges very closely on parallelism; for it is only the *ultimate* action of each that affects the other as a whole, while their proximate or immediate interaction is localized or specialized. I may express this aspect of the problem better perhaps by saying that ultimate control by either mind or body is certainly effected by them as wholes, but that this is distinct from their specific or detailed activities. If, *e. g.*, I depress a key with my finger, the total body control is distinct from the special finger action, although both are necessary; and in much the same way, the facts both of brain structure and of mind organization seem to imply that each kind of psychical activity maintains a constant relation with one and the same part of the brain. This need not be a point-to-point or one-to-one relation, but it certainly seems to take the form of a constant connection between what may be called the "organs" of brain and of mind, respectively, analogous to the special functions peculiar to each organ of the body itself, even while this acts as a whole.

2. In this respect Dr. Carr's assertion that a rat, although more cunning, is "not better equipped neurologically for its special activities" than a rabbit (p. 24), seems to be doubtful. I am not certain what "better neurological equipment" exactly means, but it can not imply that the higher cerebral centers of the two species present little or no difference; for if that is the case, evolution has modified diversely every bodily and also every mental detail of their constitu-

tion except these centers, which is an inconceivable supposition. Dr. Carr refers to the "complexity and quantity of specific (cerebral?) contrivances;" and if we compare a bee with a rabbit, quantity of cerebral substance in itself certainly appears negligible. But this by no means implies that the relative proportions and efficiency of the various parts of this matter, whatever its quantity, are equally unimportant. May they not stand somewhat in the same relation as, *e. g.*, a modern pocket pistol to a blunderbuss? If again we recall the importance assigned by Bergson to insect instinct, and the strong support always accorded by Dr. Carr himself to Bergson's system, his theory of neurological indifference here becomes still more remarkable.

3. Somewhat in the same way he misinterprets the relation between the higher brain centers and skilled action, which he regards as an instance of "brain development quite disparate from mind development" (p. 25). The facts, however, seem to support a directly contrary view. In the first place, the coordination of skilled movements centers not mainly nor directly in the cerebral hemispheres, but in the cerebellum and corpus striatum, the control of the higher tracts over these being but general and supervisory; and further, the *acquirement* of skill (as Dr. Carr himself admits) depends essentially on "the higher cerebral centers," though not necessarily on those which are predominant in a "mental giant" without any skill. The function of these is just to educate the muscular and lower nervous systems to such a degree that they can act automatically and independently; the only alternative being to regard all increase in skill, which quite obviously demands a higher intelligence of its own special kind, as never in any case a psychical activity—never the operation of mind as a whole. And to infer that mind development is here wholly disparate is to argue that the high efficiency of a first-class boat crew proves the absence of a trainer, when in fact it proves exactly the reverse.

Before passing to what appear still more fundamental difficulties in Dr. Carr's treatment, I may note one or two puzzling discrepancies, which may be no more, however, than inadequacies in expression. We may contrast then the statement on p. 18, "We can and do conceive the living body as complete in itself without the accompaniment of consciousness," with that on p. 20, "It is impossible for me to think that my body without my mind is still my body;" and again (p. 19), the "function of coordination is not exercised by any specific structure," but (p. 20), "the mechanism by which coordination is effected can be located in the cerebral cortex," which, however, is undoubtedly a "structure" highly complicated and "specific."

4. When we come to consider Dr. Carr's final theory of the ultimate basis of the interaction between mind and body, it seems to add nothing whatever to our understanding of the problem; for it takes the unsatisfying form of an appeal, if not to unknowable, certainly to unknown or even purely hypothetical, agencies. Psychical activity, self-organized into mind, and bodily process, also as a whole, are, while disparate in nature, yet intimately connected in their activity; and thought seeks some explanation or ground of this mysterious union of opposites. Dr. Carr's own conclusion is that "the forces, whatever they are, which are molding the body are the *identical forces which are forming the mind.*"[4] But such a solution of the difficulty is purely formal, abstract, scholastic; it at once raises the original question in a new form, for we are compelled to ask what is the nature of these forces, and how, being identical, do they come to manifest themselves on these absolutely disparate planes? The incomprehensibility of the concrete phenomena, as we actually find them in experience, is in no degree removed by the inconceivability of the action of abstractly identical unknown forces.

A somewhat similar defect characterizes Dr. Carr's reference of this dual manifestation of mind and brain to an origin in "life as an undifferentiated unity" (p. 33); for even had we experience of such life—and Dr. Carr admits that this does not exist—still this could in no way be an "undifferentiated unity," for such a conception is at once logically inconceivable and existentially impossible. Unity, in any real sense, must in some way be differentiated; for the obvious reason that if there be no diversity whatever, neither can there be any true unity, for unity is essentially the overcoming of differences—if America, *e. g.*, were not differentiated, there could be no *United* States. At the most there could be but a featureless uniformity, which under no conditions can be conceived as the real origin of the dual world of bodily and mental life. An "undifferentiated unity" then is but a logical chimera; even did it exist, how could self-differentiation arise within it? Some *που στω*—some basis of differentiation—is indispensable.

Finally, if Dr. Carr is correct in assigning, as their distinctive and mutually exclusive characters, freedom to mind, and necessity to the body (p. 31), then it becomes impossible for these to be (as he regards them) wholly antithetical. For freedom is fundamentally misconceived when it is regarded as the antithesis of necessity; on the contrary, it is its logical and inevitable complement; for each alike can be expressed in terms of determination, or (better) of

[4] P. 27; italics mine.

degrees of self-determination. Throughout the universe of concrete reality, this latter everywhere exists and operates in some degree; if but slightly, then determination is mainly from without, and "necessity" reigns; but as the level of internal self-determination rises, it becomes gradually transformed into "freedom"; and just as the mind is nowhere wholly free, so the body and the material universe as a whole are never completely dominated by necessity. To say therefore with Dr. Carr that one is rigidly determined and the other free, is to abandon that antithesis between them which is from the outset indispensable to his whole argument.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Introduction to Philosophy. HOLLY ESTIL CUNNINGHAM. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1920. Pp. 257.

Time was—perhaps still is—when an introduction to philosophy consisted in casting the young, unsuspecting mind overboard from the craft of everyday thought into the vast and vague deep of fundamental questions, and bidding it strike out and swim or sink —below the college passing mark. Professor Cunningham's "introduction" is in strong contrast with this Jonah-like process. With remarkable deliberation for so small a volume, in chapter after chapter, he points out to the student the contours of the solid shoreline of science and common fact, and how they reach down in slope after slope to the sea of philosophy. Then he leads his charge a little way into the water, showing him that the same earth is still underfoot, but adding that the water is much deeper beyond—in places unplumbed. This course commends itself as more merciful to the bewildered and perhaps shivery novice; but is it an introduction to philosophy? Can one get a real acquaintance with metaphysics or ethics—more than a bowing one—without actually grappling with their problems? Is wading a mean proportional between land travel and swimming?

The author begins with a plea for the genetic method. This appears to be sound logically; but has he recognized the pedagogic limitations of that method? A study of origins can be very dull and pointless to those who have not yet acquired an interest in the subject matter.

In the next five chapters a survey is made of what are called the psychological, physiological and social "backgrounds to philosophy," which prove to be substantially the fields of social psychology and anthropology. This course the author justifies on the ground that

"philosophy is one type of action, one method of meeting problems, one way of responding to stimuli," and that a consideration, for example, of the "psychological background" is essential, because: "(*a*) It shows what are the springs, the sources of our action; (*b*) it makes clear the point that these springs of action determine within what limits our philosophical, scientific, social, and political problems must move; (*c*) it shows that all knowledge, even philosophy, is for action." Unfortunately it is quite doubtful if the author's summary description of the instincts and other human conations will show the students these extensive principles.

As to the need for the *physical* background Dr. Cunningham finds it illustrated in the fact that the Greek cosmography is "a reflection of their environment" and the Eskimo hell is "cold and dark"—in strong contrast with the Jewish. "Buddhism," he adds, "looks upon heaven as the cessation of all activity, and we little wonder that this is so when we think of the incessant struggle against the steaming heat and humidity of the Himalayan lowlands."

So, likewise, does philosophy "reflect the *social* conditions from which it has arisen and of which it is a part." "In the same way that we speak of eighteenth-century literature, dress, or modes of travel, we may speak of eighteenth-century philosophy." This may be a sound thesis, but the reader will have to take it mostly on authority. It is not really developed argumentatively in the book, nor is it even illustrated on any considerable scale. *Political* and *religious* situations are referred to with more or less success to account for certain philosophical systems—the idealisms of Plato and Berkeley, for example—but the actual bearing, the conditioning relations, of other social or anthropological phenomena on any actual philosophical development is only remotely indicated. Surely it is a far cry to connect Descartes's "thinking substance" with the Orphic religion and his "extended substance" with the Olympian element in Greece. Indeed, could it well be otherwise? Is it feasible to establish such non-obvious relations in a small *introductory* book? Does not the nature of the undertaking require that the reader should be already acquainted with the phenomena—the philosophical conceptions—to be accounted for? The extensive backgrounds sketched as the conditioning environment of philosophy are rather factors which have shaped more or less *all* culture—science, law, art, *etc.*—as well as philosophy; and commonly their influence in this field is much less evident, and probably less potent, than in other directions of human interest. The author virtually admits this when he quotes approvingly the remark of Seth that, "national characteristics are never so strongly marked in science

and philosophy as in other branches of literature, and their influence takes longer in making itself felt," a principle which finds illustration in the connection which the author makes between the empiricism and pragmatism of the English and their insular situation, with its premium upon individual enterprise and experience—perhaps his most successful attempt. The influence of the British national situation is much more evident upon its commerce, industry, and politics, than upon its philosophy.

Professor Cunningham will have us believe that Plato, being embittered by the Democracy's treatment of Socrates, "set about consequently with the definite purpose of showing that *individualism* and *change are philosophically unsound.*" This may account for Plato's course in Athenian politics; but can it be the full story of the motives of that many-sided thinker—a man whose ideas after twenty-four centuries are still potent in politics, ethics, and theology? Moreover, as one reads he wonders how much idea the new student will get of Plato's actual teachings. Of the very few of these that are referred to, the author tells him (quite properly) that the Platonic Ideas are not thoughts—but types—the patterns "after which all particular things are made." The teleological position and function of the Ideas is not mentioned; so that the student, so far as he grasps the teaching at all, is likely to conceive of Platonic idealism as a set of plans regarded as employed by a divine architect, rather than as a posited system of goals toward which all becoming is striving, however imperfectly. Such a conception, of course, leaves the perennial vitality of Platonism an enigma.

One's feeling of inadequacy is heightened when Berkeley's idealism is accounted for entirely on religious grounds—as the attempt of a zealous defender of the faith and opponent of science to overcome materialism by showing that all material objects (so-called) are mental phenomena and therefore the creations of spirit, which is the only substance. That this was a secondary interest of Berkeley's is likely enough; but to find in it his main purpose is to forget that he developed his system when he was a young man, and long before he became a bishop. It is to overlook the fact that theism did not in Berkeley's day cry out for a defender, the dominant philosophies of Descartes and Locke being staunchly theistic; and to overlook, also, a situation especially significant in this connection, namely, that English materialists almost to a man were theists. Even Hobbes argued for the existence of God, and called himself a Christian. And again the question arises whether, in the analysis of Berkeley's motives and methods, the student will feel the force of that thinker's actual contention, and the seriousness, intellectually speaking, of the problem of existences independent of any knowing mind.

When the author comes to Kant and objective idealism even political and religious conditioning agencies begin to yield to purely intellectual ones, religion being but one of the four shaping influences discovered in Kantianism, the others being intellectual, and the political and social situations of the time not being considered at all. (And, by the way, why should Kant, with his agnostic emphases, be chosen as the representative of objective idealism? After his exploits in the field of pure reason can he be thought of as admitting to the status of realities and objects of knowledge ideas described as independent of the individual mind?)

The concluding three chapters of the book are devoted to the influence of the theory of evolution on all departments of thought—of course, a purely intellectual conditioning factor.

It should be added that Professor Cunningham writes in a clear and forcible style; that he gives many evidences of wide reading, often makes apt characterizations, and withal commonly takes view-points which appeal to readers of empirical and pragmatic leanings. As he sees it, for example, one fundamental but double-faced question arose out of the heterogeneity of the Greek population and the changefulness of Greek political affairs. Externally it was the query, "Is there anything *permanent* in the universe? Is there a common principle that runs through all the differences that man perceives?" The new political and social situation following the Persian war, with its new individualistic outlook upon life, turned to light the reverse, or internal, face of the question, namely. "Is there a principle in *man* which is abiding and permanent, and which is common to all men?" "Both questions arose necessarily from the very conditions of Greek life." They are the same "but directed toward a different subject matter"—"one, the problem of the outer world; the other, the problem of the inner world: one, matter or nature; the other, mind or soul." The second of these, with its inescapable *homo mensura* doctrine, becomes the tap-root of the main divisions of modern philosophy. "Is man the measure of truth? This raises the problem of *logic* and *epistemology*, or of knowledge. Is man the measure of *right* and *good?* This, in turn, raises the problem of *politics* and *ethics*. Is man the measure of the *beautiful?* This is the problem of *esthetics*. Thus out of the teachings of the sophists . . . came, in part, the first formulation of the . . . fields within which discussions of a philosophic nature would take place."

Another interesting example of the author's view-points is his account of the animus of the Hellenistic ethical and religious schools. In those stormy days the individual man, finding "the world had got the better of him," sought "to get away from the world of the

object to the world of the subject." He had the belief that the world within was his own, and that he could there find life abundantly." Man, "when the situation gets the better of him," "quits thinking and becomes a poet, romancer, or mystic. Man generally becomes Orphic in his tendencies at the point of loss of control over the facts of his social and political life." Plotinus, for example, represents people who "have lost in the battles of life," and who "fall, like the Oriental and the primitive man, before the powers as a worshiper, rather than an investigator."

It is in his treatment of empiricism and evolutionism that Dr. Cunningham shows the fullest appreciation, and makes the justest comments, no doubt because the pragmatic interest and the interest and the instrumental conception of knowledge are most congenial to him. Like Locke, he "sees in philosophy a method of making a better world. He believes that the idea of creation which we have sketched here [the instrumentalists' idea] gives man a vote in the affairs of the universe, . . . encourages him to attempt things 'unattempted yet in prose or rhyme,' inspires him to the creation of 'more stately mansions,' and to the forsaking of his 'low-vaulted past.' He believes that the days of authority are over . . . and he offers this dynamic universe as a challenge, . . . a universe to be won or lost at man's option, a universe not to fall down before and worship . . . but a universe to be controlled, directed, and recreated by man's intelligence."

One lays this suggestive book down with the feeling that the author might well employ his learning and insight to better advantage than that of searching out the influence of primitive man's initiation ceremonies upon, say, the *Critique of the Practical Reason!*

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, July, 1919. *The Social Significance of Education* (pp. 345–369): H. W. WRIGHT.–The three conceptions, language, invention and art, conceptions deduced from a study of the content of perception in its early phase as revealed by evolution, furnish appropriate ideas for an interpretation of the educational process. Education should aim at rational communication (language), cooperative industry (invention) and emotional concord (art). *The Logic of Cosmology* (pp. 370–378): BENJAMIN IVES GILMAN.–Expressed on one sentence: "Either there is no such thing as soul, in which case, since gravitation stops when I've gone by, the

All of things is not a Cosmos; or there is nothing else than Soul; in which case the All of things is at once a Cosmos, and potentially tripartite." *The Descriptive Method in Philosophy* (pp. 379–390): D. T. HOWARD.–A criticism of the pragmatic theory of knowledge as set forth by Dewey. Concludes that the descriptive method is not an exact account of "immediate experience," is not as definite as it is claimed to be, and is untenable in the light of all of the facts of experience. *The Function of Intuition in Descartes' Philosophy of Science* (pp. 391–409): JAMES L. MURSELL.–Descartes' interest was not metaphysical, as has been traditionally held, but scientific. His doctrine of intuition is not metaphysical, but arose in connection with scientific methodology. Intuition as a scientific instrument of method originates the epistemological inquiry as to objectivity and externality. *Reviews of Books:* Edward Gleason Spaulding, *The New Rationalism: The Development of a Constructive Realism upon the Basis of Modern Logic and Science, and through the Criticism of Opposed Philosophical Systems,* EDWARD L. SCHAUB. Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics,* A. S. FERGUSON. Benedetto Croce, *Teoria e storia della Storiografia,* ALLAN H. GILBERT. *Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.*

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, September, 1919. *Philosophy in France, 1918* (pp. 443–465): ANDRÉ LALANDE.–Contains a summary of the chief philosophical and psychological writings of the year. Notes the death of two striking figures, Jules Lachelier and Gaston Milhaud. *Platonic Pluralism in Esthetics* (pp. 466–478): HELEN HUSS PARKHURST.–Starting from the position that human beings are temperamentally different, the writes states, critically examines and rejects the theory of art attributed to a comment made by Flaubert that "for every idea, every inward vision of the beautiful, there is but one name, one perfect epithet, the task of the artist being the quest of this unique word." *On Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Will to Power* (pp. 479–490): G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM.–Enquires whether Nietzsche's doctrine of the Will to Power, the basic doctrine of his philosophy of life, can logically support the individualism built upon it. Concludes that it can not. Believes that "in principle, the Christian ideal of the 'brotherhood of man' . . . is more nearly consistent with the doctrine of the Will to Power" than the ideas set up by Nietzsche. *Manichæan Tendencies in the History of Philosophy.* (pp. 491–510): HENRY NEUMANN.–Designating as Manichæan, "(1) the belief that there are two distinct principles, good and evil, in active conflict, (2) the assumption that the good principle is limited in power, (3) the prominence given to the struggle against evil

in human life as related to the cosmic conflict," traces the expression of such views in the history of thought from the earliest times to the present. *Reviews of Books:* George Plimpton Adams, *Idealism and the Modern Age,* J. E. CREIGHTON. Wilmon Henry Sheldon, *Strife of Systems and Productive Duality,* GEORGE P. ADAMS. Henry Fairfield Osborn, *The Origin and Evolution of Life,* J. E. BOODIN. William Ralph Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus,* KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE. *Summaries of Articles. Notes.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, September, 1919. *Child and Educational Psychology Number,* edited by B. T. Baldwin. *General Reviews and Summaries: Child Psychology* (pp. 299–315): D. MITCHELL. – Sixty-four references, all in English are reviewed. *Educational Psychology* (pp. 315–335): C. TRUMAN GRAY. – One hundred and eighty-seven references are mentioned. Interest in educational tests continues. There is a rapidly growing interest in general intelligence tests as a basis for educational procedure. Considerable attention is being paid to educational diagnosis and prognosis. The references are grouped according to (1) text books, (2) monographs, (3) various forms of mental activity, (4) certain educational problems, (5) elementary and high school subjects. *Special Reviews:* Lewis M. Terman, *The Intelligence of School Children:* LOUISA WAGONER. R. R. Rusk, *Experimental Education:* H. J. PETERSON.

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NOTES AND NEWS

WE acknowledge the receipt of the first issue of a new quarterly journal of philosophy, theology and literature, entitled *The Personalist.* It is edited by Professor Ralph Tyler Flewelling, of the

Department of Philosophy of the University of Southern California, and is published by the University at Los Angeles. Judging from the initial number of this quarterly, it would appear that it is devoted to the promotion of that particular philosophical attitude which Professor Borden Parker Bowne represented. Under the title "To the Gentle Personalist" the editor makes the following appeal:

"In his last public address Dr. Bowne said something about his work being done. To the students whom he had taught to bend the bow and aim the shaft he left the remaining task.

"Since those words were spoken ten years have passed. With the passage of years the significance of his thought has grown upon us as the proportions of a mountain clear themselves with distance. The effect of those teachings, however, can be perpetuated only as they enter into the living thought of to-day through living channels. On this task many men have been working disconnectedly and fragmentarily. It is now time to furnish a focus for the perpetuation of that wisdom which has meant so much to us. Bowne would have been the last of all of us to wish the slavish perpetuation of his teaching or interpretations for he was no literalist, believing rather in the inspiration which giveth life. Is not the personalistic interpretation of life worth magnifying? Will you do your share by subscription, voice and pen? The line of action is clear.

"To other Personalists it may seem worth while to perpetuate the theistic and personalistic type of philosophy. So far as we know this is the first undisguised attempt in this form to provide a nucleus for such thinking. Will you share with us the labors and responsibilities? Doubtless others could have done it better, but someone must needs start."

Another new quarterly of theology and philosophy is *Gregorianum,* which made its first appearance in January of this year. It is published by the professors of the Pontificia Università Gregoriana at Rome, with the collaboration of certain professors of the Compagnia di Gesu. Like the *Revista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica,* it is devoted to scholastic philosophy, but it will differ from the older review in emphasizing speculative and critical subjects, rather than scholarship and research.

ARRANGEMENTS are already under way for the next annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. At the invitation of the President and Department of Philosophy of Columbia University the meeting will be held in New York from December 28 to 30, 1920. It is hoped that the central

location will make possible an unusually large attendance. The subject for discussion which was chosen at the last meeting of the Association was "The aims and methods of teaching philosophy." The Executive Committee feels that the Association in choosing this topic did not wish a discussion on the contents of courses or methods of conducting class exercises, but rather a consideration of the broader field of the relation of philosophy to college education and the whole life of the nation. It accordingly proposes that the topic be restated as: "The rôle of the philosopher in modern life, with reference both to teaching and to research."

A MEETING of the Aristotelian Society was held in London on March 22, 1920, with Professor Wildon Carr in the chair. Mr. Clement C. J. Webb read a paper on, "Obligation, Autonomy, and the Common Good." He contended that the notion of obligation, in which Kant rightly found the essential feature of our moral consciousness, can not be directly derived (as Green seems to suppose) from the notion of a "common good"; that on the contrary the notion of a "common good," as also the closely connected notion of a "general will," derives its significance for ethics, and eventually for politics also, from its connection with the notion of obligation: and that this makes it necessary for any truly ethical conception of the state to retain the idea of "authority," as ascertained indeed through the general will, because only thus can it be recognized as authority *viz.* the community for itself; not however as in itself merely the result of the general will, but as the expression of an absolute factor therein, which perhaps may be best described as the sovereignty of God. To the thought expressed in Kant's choice of the word "autonomy" to express the status of the good will may be traced along one line of descent the anti-authoritarian tendency in contemporary ethics and politics.

AN international meeting of British and French philosophical societies will be held at Oxford, England, September 24 to 27, 1920. An invitation has also been extended to the American Philosophical Association and it is hoped that some representation from both the Eastern and Western Branches of this body can be arranged, although the date of the meeting precludes a very large attendance of American philosophers.

DR. ALBERT G. A. BALZ, of the University of Virginia, has been promoted from associate professor to professor of philosophy.